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Why DoWe Need ‘Myth-Busting’ in the
Study of Sino–African Relations?
MIWA HIRONO and SHOGO SUZUKI*
The literature on Sino–African relations has debated whether or not China’s growing
presence is a threat to Western or African interests, and has come to the conclusion that
China’s behavior is not uniquely immoral. Many countries, including Western liberal
democracies, similarly give aid to local autocrats to secure natural resources. Why, then, has
so much effort been made to come to this perhaps unsurprising conclusion? We argue that the
literature on Chinese foreign policy remains heavily influenced by Western states’ policy
interests, resulting in an impoverished debate that is primarily concerned with the idea of a
China threat. In order to recover the diversity in our research on Chinese foreign policy, we
argue for the need to go beyond the confines of Western strategic interests.
Introduction
No topic of China’s international relations in recent years has captured the
imagination of both popular and academic audiences more than China’s relations
with the African continent. The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) relations with
Africa date back much earlier. Beijing was particularly active there from the late
1950s to the 1970s, when it was attempting to escape from the diplomatic alienation
imposed on it by both the Western and Soviet-led Eastern blocs.1 The Chinese poured
*Miwa Hirono is RCUK Research Fellow at the School of Politics and International Relations and Senior Research
Fellow at the China Policy Institute, at the University of Nottingham, UK. She is also a visiting fellow at the Australian
National University. Her publications include China’s Evolving Approach to Peacekeeping (Routledge, 2012) and
Civilizing Missions: International Christian Agencies in China (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). Shogo Suzuki is Senior
Lecturer in the Department of Politics at the University of Manchester, UK. He is the author ofCivilization and Empire:
China and Japan’s Encounters with European International Society (Routledge, 2009), as well as several articles on
Chinese foreign policy and Sino–Japanese relations. This research was funded by the RCUK Fellowship Recruitment
Fund andwritten in the framework of the CoReach project on ‘Europe andChina:AddressingNew International Security
and Development Challenges in Africa’, funded by the British Academy and the European Union. The earlier version of
this article was presented at the International Studies Association (ISA) Annual Convention, San Diego, 1–4 April 2012.
For their help in writing this article, we would like to thank Catherine Gegout (leader of the Co-Reach project), Katherine
Morton, Deborah Brautigam, Tadokoro Masayuki, Thomas Wheeler and Kitamura Akihiko. We are also grateful to the
anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on the earlier version of this article. The authors can be reached by email
at Miwa.Hirono@nottingham.ac.uk and Shogo.Suzuki@manchester.ac.uk.
1. Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking’s Support for Wars of National Liberation
(Berkeley, CA:University of California Press, 1973); AlabaOgunsanwo,China’s Policy in Africa 1958–1971 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1974); Philip Snow, The Star Raft: China’s Encounter with Africa (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1989).
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substantial resources into providing aid (the Tan–Zam Railway being the most
famous example), and trumpeted its support for the anti-colonial and counter-
hegemonic struggles of the developing world. After Deng Xiaoping initiated the
opening up policy in the 1980s, however, Sino–African relations faded from China’s
diplomatic priorities. Eager to achieve economic growth and bolster the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) regime’s legitimacy, Beijing concentrated on deepening
economic and diplomatic ties with the industrialized world. Aid to Africa was cut
back, and the revolutionary rhetoric of Third World solidarity was muted.2 For a
while—bar the early 1990s, when Beijing again found itself isolated following its
suppression of the 1989 demonstrations in Tiananmen Square—the PRC’s relations
with the African continent appeared to be put on the backburner.
All this has seemingly changed since the beginning of the twenty-first century. The
growth of the PRC’s influence and presence in Africa has indeed been remarkable.
Politically, the PRChas sought to enhance its relations by convening a number of high-
level summits between Chinese and African leaders, as seen by the convocation of the
Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) since 2000. The Chinese government
has also increased its aid to Africa, and cancelled debts.3 Meanwhile, under the slogan
of ‘going out’ (zou chu qu), Chinese firms have sought to expand overseas, including
Africa. China’s growing need for natural resources has meant that Chinese enterprises
are increasingly active in developingmines and oil wells, and today China’s oil import
from Africa accounts for 30% of the country’s entire oil supply.4
This growth in Chinese political, security and economic activity has generated a
flurry of literature, which can broadly be divided into two genres. The first generally
sees the PRC as a threat to the interests of both Africa and the international
community, because of their alleged role in supporting corrupt African autocrats and
preventing the spread of ‘good governance’ in the region. These negative views find
traction within the highest levels of the Western political elite—British prime
minister David Cameron echoed these themes when he was quoted as being
‘increasingly alarmed by Beijing’s leading role in the new “scramble for Africa”’,
and ‘warned African states over China’s “authoritarian capitalism” . . . claiming that
it is unsustainable in the long term’.5
This literature has, in turn, generated the second group of works whose primary
purpose is to engage in ‘myth-busting’ in the study of Sino–African relations.6
Scholars put Chinese foreign policy in Africa in context, and point out that not only
2. Philip Snow, ‘China and Africa: consensus and camouflage’, in Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh,
eds, Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).
3. Hu Jinshan, Feizhou de zhongguo xingxiang [Africa’s Image of China ] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2010).
4. US Energy Information Administration, China Energy Data, Statistics and Analysis: Oil, Gas, Electricity,
Coal (2011), available at: http://www.eia.gov/cabs/china/Full.html. Also see Joshua Eisenman, ‘China–Africa trade
patterns: causes and consequences’, Journal of Contemporary China 21(77), (2012), pp. 793–810.
5. Jason Groves, ‘Cameron warns Africans over the “Chinese invasion” as they pour billions into continent’,
Mail Online, (20 July 2011), available at: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2016677/Cameron-warns-
Africans-Chinese-invasion-pour-billions-continent.html (accessed 23 February 2013).
6. Chris Alden, China in Africa (London: Zed Books, 2007); Erica S. Downs, ‘The fact and fiction of Sino–
African energy relations’, China Security 3(3), (2007), pp. 42–68; Shogo Suzuki, ‘Chinese soft power, insecurity
studies, myopia and fantasy’, Third World Quarterly 30(4), (2009), pp. 779–793; Ian Taylor, China’s New Role in
Africa (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2009); Deborah Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China
in Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).




























Chinese but also Western actors are responsible for their lack of political will to solve
Africa’s security and governance problems. It is indeed not too difficult to search for
examples to illustrate the point that China and many Western governments often
behave very similarly in the realm of foreign policy. Western governments have
provided support for regimes with notorious records for suppressing human rights—
British and American support for the Mubarak regime in Egypt is a case in point.
Similarly, despite its rather convenient change in tune of late, the British government
was also complicit in cultivating closer relations with the Gaddafi regime in Libya.
In sum, the recent debates on China in Africa have taught us that China is actually not
that ‘different’ compared to many other Western states—while the effects of the
PRC’s growing influence in the African continent have been mixed, this does not
make China a uniquely pernicious presence.
These studies have certainly enriched our knowledge of Chinese foreign policy
behavior in Africa. However—and without wishing to downplay the contribution of
these works—should we be surprised by these conclusions? While realism has come
under considerable criticism within the discipline of International Relations (IR) of
late, one of its most enduring and important insights is that states are not radically
different from one another, in that they pursue their own strategic self-interests, often
with scant regard for the international norms they rhetorically claim to adhere to. Yet,
this arguably predictable point is presented almost as a surprise or a discovery in the
literature on Sino–African relations.
Why is this so? In this article we suggest that this is because the study of Chinese
foreign policy continues to be structured by a powerful discourse which claims that
China’s rise to power presents a unique and almost unprecedented challenge to the
maintenance of the Western-dominated world order. This consequently results in a
myopic and dichotomized debate of whether or not Chinese policies in Africa are
‘bad’ or not. We aim to problematize this starting assumption that has colored the
study of Sino–African relations. In doing so, we forward two arguments. First, the
study of China has been closely linked to the national interest of Western states, and
this structural dynamic means that the field of Chinese foreign policy revolves
around one primary axis that is chiefly concerned with whether or not the PRC is
becoming a threat to Western power and interests. Second, it argues that the
enduring Eurocentrism in IR means that the rise of non-Western powers is under-
theorized, resulting in an impoverished vision of a world order where Western
hegemony is no longer guaranteed. This, in turn, generates suspicions and fears
analogous to the ‘Yellow Peril’ thesis: the rise of an Asian power is implicitly seen
as a ‘unique’ and ‘unknown’ development that would somehow threaten the moral
fabric of the international order that has historically been constructed and
dominated by the West. We will conclude by suggesting an alternative research
agenda in Sino–African relations that go beyond national security and Western-
centric agenda.
Academia and the national security agenda
For Western scholars, studies of China’s international relations are generally still in
the service of the national security agenda of the Western policy community.




























Historically, the study of the non-West has been closely linked to Western
government policies. Long before the term ‘area studies’ came into existence in the
United States (US) in the 1950s, there was a notion that scholarship should serve the
political goals of the elite. ‘Oriental studies’ was recognized as a discipline in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, due to Western colonialists’ needs to control
non-Western people.7 For example, Sir William Jones, a British legal scholar,
founded the Asiatic Society of Bengal in 1784, and also worked as an official of the
British East India Company; he felt absolutely no conflict of interest in serving
imperialism and set the pattern which later Orientalists and area studies experts
emulated.8
In addition to those who engaged in commercial activities, Christian missionaries laid
the foundation for the development of Orientalism, with a belief that the West should
help the non-West adopt ‘superior’ Western civilization.9 Edward Said rightly states
that the purpose of Orientalism was ‘to understand, in some cases to control,
manipulate, even incorporate, what is a manifestly different world’.10 Later, social
anthropologists joined the Orientalists by bringing more in-depth understanding of
the customs and lifestyles of the colonized, in order to aid colonial administrators and
missionaries.11
However, it was only after World War II (WWII) that area studies really
flourished. One of the earliest and best known examples of this genre of scholarship
was The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture, written by
American anthropologist Ruth Benedict in 1946. This was the product of Benedict’s
involvement with the US Office of War Information during WWII.12 As the Cold
War and the subsequent standoff between the US and the Soviet Union became
entrenched in the 1950s, area studies served to fulfill the West’s strategic need to
understand the enemy or processes by which states hostile to Western interests could
be brought into the so-called ‘free world’. Research on Asia, particularly China and
Japan, was a major beneficiary of this development. As Bruce Cummings states:
Japan got a favored placement as a success story of development, and China got
obsessive attention as a pathological example of abortive development. The key
processes were things like modernization, or what was for many years called ‘political
development’ toward the explicit or implicit goal of liberal democracy.13
7. Asaf Hussain, Robert Olson and Jamil Qureshi, Orientalism, Islam and Islamists (Beltsville, MD: Amana
Books, 1984), p. 11.
8. Stuart Schaar, ‘Orientalism at the service of imperialism’, Race and Class XXI(1), (1979), p. 68.
9. Miwa Hirono, Civilizing Missions: International Religious Agencies in China (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2008).
10. Edward W. Said, Orientalism (London: Penguin, 1977), p. 12.
11. Hussain et al., Orientalism, Islam and Islamists, p. 11.
12. Ruth Benedict’s wartime involvement with the US Office of War Information is presented in two US
government reports published in 1943 and 1944. Sonia Ryang, Chrysanthemum’s Strange Life: Ruth Benedict in
Postwar Japan, Occasional Paper No. 32 (Japan Policy Research Institute, University of San Francisco Center for the
Pacific Rim, July 2004), available at: http://www.jpri.org/publications/occasionalpapers/op32.html (accessed 12
November 2012).
13. Bruce Cummings, ‘Boundary displacement: area studies and international studies during and after the Cold
War’, Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 29(1), (January–March 1997), p. 9.




























Cummings also documents various area studies departments’ close working relations
with US government agencies in the early Cold War period, particularly their role in
providing a steady source of new recruits and specialist consultants: ‘For those
scholars studying potential enemy countries, either they consulted with the
government or they risked being investigated by the FBI; working for the CIA thus
legitimized academics and fended off J. Edgar Hoover’.14
While the Cold War has officially ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union,
there still remains ample state demand for the study of China, partly because of the
‘concern’ of Western elites that China is the only strategically competitive peer that
could pose a real threat to the West’s power and dominance. China is the last
remaining communist great power, and its antipathy to liberal democratic
governance, coupled with its steady military build-up, has made it a latent ‘threat’
to Western interests. Therefore, the research agenda of Chinese foreign policy in
Africa continues to be influenced by this national interest. For example, the US
Congressional Research Service (CRS) has published five reports between 2008 and
2009 on China’s activities in Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia, showing
heightened US interests and anxieties in this field.15 Furthermore, China is the only
non-African country to feature in the CRS’s reports on Africa. Studies of the US or
Europe in Africa are conspicuously absent.16
Scholars and analysts have also jumped on this policy bandwagon, and published a
series of works that confirm China’s ‘threat’ in Africa. Authors of these works voice
their disquiet that the Chinese government is trying to sabotage Western attempts to
introduce ‘good governance’ (such as liberal democratic governance or improved
transparency) by propagating its model of ‘authoritarian capitalism’. Many also warn
darkly that an important part of China’s objectives in Africa is to challenge US global
hegemony.17 China’s non-conditional aid—denounced as ‘rogue aid’ by some
critics—and trade-oriented relations with ‘rogue states’ such as Sudan and Zimbabwe
are frequently criticized, because they undermine attempts to introduce democracy to
the region, provide a lifeline for autocratic rulers, and encourage and exacerbate
human rights abuses by them.18 In the words of Gemot Pehnelt, ‘Chinese engagement
enables African governments to reject demands made by the IMF, the World Bank
and other donors for enhancing transparency, implementing anti-corruption
14. Ibid., p. 11.
15. Congressional Research Service, China’s Foreign Policy and ‘Soft Power’ in South America, Asia and Africa,
(2008), available at: http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/104589.pdf; Congressional Research Service,
Comparing Global Influence: China’s and US Diplomacy, Foreign Aid, Trade, and Investment in the Developing
World, (15 August 2008), available at: http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/109507.pdf; Congressional
Research Service, China’s Foreign Policy: What Does it Mean for US Global Interests?, (18 July 2008), available at:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34588.pdf; Congressional Research Service, China’s Foreign Aid Activities in
Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia, (25 February 2009), available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40361.
pdf; Congressional Research Service, China’s Assistance and Government-sponsored Investment Activities in Africa,
Latin America, and Southeast Asia, (25 November 2009), available at: http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/
133511.pdf (all accessed 20 April 2012).
16. US Department of State, Africa, (n.d.), available at: http://fpc.state.gov/c20410.htm (accessed 20 April 2012).
17. Horace Campbell, ‘China in Africa: challenging US global hegemony’, Third World Quarterly 29(1), (2008),
pp. 89–105.
18. Moise´s Naı´m, ‘Rogue aid’, Foreign Policy 159, (2007), pp. 95–96; see also Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm
Offensive: How China’s Soft Power is Transforming the World (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007).




























strategies, and furthering their democratization efforts’.19 China’s priority is, these
scholars argue, simply to secure energy resources rather than to improve human
rights conditions in those states.20 Chinese firms (often bundled together under the
somewhat misleading label of ‘China’ or ‘China Inc.’) are also accused of
neocolonial behavior, such as exploiting African workers, flooding the African
market with cheap Chinese consumer goods and ruining the local economy, or
stripping African states of their resources.21
It is, of course, necessary to acknowledge that not all works portray China as a
threat, as evidenced from the ‘myth-busting’ literature. Brautigam demonstrates that
much of China’s allegedly pernicious political influence is greatly exaggerated, and
that its aid can, at times, actually deliver real benefits to the recipient states.22 China’s
aid to authoritarian leaders has not been as vast as is often claimed, and is not as
susceptible to being misused. With regard to weapons trade, Western corporations
also engage in arms trade with rogue states (at times far more than the Chinese),
making Western criticisms of Chinese weapons sales ring somewhat hollow—in fact,
a recent study has concluded that the US ‘tends to transfer conventional arms to
authoritarian regimes to a greater extent than does China, which in turn tends to
export more to African democracies and regimes that generally respect human
rights’.23 Studies on China’s development activities in Africa have also found that
Beijing’s role in propping up isolated African autocrats is greatly exaggerated: there
is, for instance, no concrete evidence of a systematic attempt to export China’s
development model of authoritarian capitalism, whose existence is highly
debatable.24 African scholars such as Adekeye Adebajo have also pointed out that
the US has provided ‘support for a cantankerous warlord’s gallery’,25 which again
reminds us that many governments support undemocratic regimes, provided that it is
in accordance with their national interests. With regard to economic exploitation of
19. Gemot Pehnelt, The Political Economy of China’s Aid Policy in Africa, Jena Economic Research Papers
No. 051 (Friedrich-Schiller-University and The Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, Germany, 2007), p. 8.
20. Ngaire Woods, ‘Whose aid? Whose influence?: China, emerging donors and the silent revolution in
development assistance’, International Affairs 84(6), (2008), pp. 1205–1221; Clemens Six, ‘The rise of postcolonial
states as donors: a challenge to the development paradigm?’, Third World Quarterly 30(6), (2009), pp. 1103–1121;
Stefan Halper, The Beijing Consensus: How China’s Authoritarian Model will Dominate the Twenty-First Century
(New York: Basic Books, 2010); Jonathan Holslag, ‘China’s diplomatic manoeuvring on the question of Darfur’,
Journal of Contemporary China 17(54), (2008), pp. 71–84; Jonathan Holslag and Sara Van Hoeymissen, eds, The
Limits of Socialization: The Search for EU–China Cooperation towards Security Challenges in Africa (Brussels:
Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies, 2010).
21. ‘The Chinese in Africa: trying to pull together’, The Economist, (20 April 2011), available at: http://www.
economist.com/node/18586448; ‘Africa and China: rumble in the jungle’, The Economist, (20 April 2011), available
at: http://www.economist.com/node/18586678 (both accessed 4 December 2012). On ‘China Inc.’, see Bates Gill and
James Reilly, ‘The tenuous hold of China Inc. in Africa’, The Washington Quarterly 30(3), (2007), pp. 37–52.
22. See Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift.
23. Indra de Soysa and Paul Midford, ‘Enter the dragon! An empirical analysis of Chinese versus US arms
transfers to autocrats and violators of human rights, 1989–2006’, International Studies Quarterly 56, (2012), p. 844.
Also see Taylor, China’s New Role in Africa.
24. Suzuki, ‘Chinese soft power, insecurity studies, myopia and fantasy’. Also see Suisheng Zhao, ‘The China
model: can it replace the Western model of modernization?’, Journal of Contemporary China 16(65), (2010), pp.
419–436; and Scott Kennedy, ‘The myth of the Beijing Consensus’, Journal of Contemporary China 19(65),
(2010), pp. 461–477.
25. Adekeye Adebajo, ‘An axis of evil? China, the United States and France in Africa’, in Kweku Ampiah and
Sanusha Naidu, eds, Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon? Africa and China (Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal
Press, 2008), p. 233.




























African labor, Chinese enterprises are found to be neither better nor worse than many
of their Western counterparts, and their buying up of African natural resources often
pales into insignificance compared to Western purchases. Yet, it is important to note
that even this type of literature is essentially an extension of the same question that
dominates the Western policy community: does China’s rise present a threat to
Western interests in Africa? The starting point of their enquiry is the same as that of
their respective governments’ national security concerns.
This close link between the academic and national security agendas in the West
suggests that there is still a key governmental interest in understanding the Chinese
‘enemy’. In the latter half of the twentieth century, the core objective of US foreign
policy was to combat communist regimes and advance liberalism and capitalism.
After the end of the Cold War, US foreign policy has strived for the maintenance of
US hegemony or, at least, US strategic superiority vis-a`-vis China. Therefore, the US
government has encouraged social scientists to study subjects that assist such policy
purposes. This is demonstrated, for example, by the fact that state funding for Asia-
related topics has been linked to government programs such as the National Security
Education Act.26 In addition, since 2008, the US Department of Defense has provided
a number of million-dollar-level Minerva Research Initiative funds to university-
based social science research programs, focusing on ‘areas of strategic importance to
US national security policy’.27 It has seven priority research topics, including
science, technology and military transformation in China and developing states.
China is the only country specifically mentioned in all seven priority research topics.
This tendency of government funding policies fostering close links between
academic and policymaking communities is replicated in other states as well. In the
United Kingdom (UK), the Research Excellence Framework (REF) and Research
Councils UK pay particular attention to the importance of ‘non-academic impact’,28
such as that on political decision making. This includes ‘fostering global economic
performance, and specifically the economic competitiveness of the United Kingdom;
increasing the effectiveness of public services and policy; enhancing quality of life,
health and creative output’.29 According to this academic strategy, one of the most
effective ways to make non-academic impact in area studies (as well as other
academic disciplines, for that matter) would be to demonstrate their utility in
achieving these goals set by the policy community. The prospect of a positive
evaluation of research impact, which leads to increased state funding to universities,
coupled with greater opportunities for applying for external funding, could serve to
encourage research that addresses the interests of the policy elites.
26. Cummings, ‘Boundary displacement’, pp. 19–22.
27. US Department of Defense,Minerva Research Initiative: Program History & Overview, (2012), available at:
http://minerva.dtic.mil/overview.html (accessed 12 December 2012).
28. The REF is a grading exercise carried out throughout the UK to assess the quality of research undertaken by
UK universities. Government funding is allocated partly on the basis of the level of ‘excellence’ universities achieve
in the REF.
29. Economic and Social Research Council, What is Impact?, (2012), available at: http://www.esrc.ac.uk/
funding-and-guidance/tools-and-resources/impact-toolkit/what-how-and-why/what-is-research-impact.aspx
(accessed 23 February 2013); Economic and Social Research Council, UK Strategic Forum—Areas for Further
Consideration, (2012), available at: http://www.esrc.ac.uk/about-esrc/information/five-areas.aspx (accessed 23
February 2013).




























Nevertheless, Stephen Walt, Joseph Nye and Alexander George argue that the gap
between scholars and policy community is ever growing.30 They claim that
policymakers tend to ignore academic research because of its irrelevance to their day-
to-day work of policymaking.31 While this gap may be the case for the disciplines of
Political Science and International Relations since WWII in general, China-specific
discussions have remained, as discussed above, closely related to the strategic
interests of the state. When area studies falls into this trap of policy research,
academic research tends to end up focusing on a predictable and stereotyped
agendum that fit with national interests. This results in what Amitav Acharya calls a
state of ‘entrapment’, which
. . . occurs when scholars, after having offered consequential intellectual input at an early
stage of policymaking . . . , remain beholden to the choices made by officials and thereby
[become] unwilling or incapable of challenging officially sanctioned pathways and
approaches for the fear of losing their access and influence.32
It is not our intention to claim that the close link between academia and policy
community is necessarily problematic. However, what we need to be vigilant about is
the tendency for policy needs to influence the academic research agenda in the study
of Sino–African relations, rather than the other way around (i.e. academic research
agenda influencing policy direction). Other options for academia include deliberately
maintaining intellectual distance from the policy community, so that scholars can
freely advance their research without being constrained by structural and political
obstacles that the policy community faces. It is problematic that much of the
scholarship on Sino–African relations remains focused on whether or not China is a
threat: such a debate is influenced by and remains confined to Western governments’
strategic interests, and could crowd out the intellectual space for alternative research
topics.
This is not to say that all literature that revolves around the China threat and ‘myth-
busting’, necessarily seeks to inform Western policymakers and their interests.33
Particularly, scholars outside Western academic circles often do not have ties with
Western policymakers and may regard the latter as antagonistic to African and/or
Chinese interests. However, research on Sino–African relations undertaken by
Chinese analysts has frequently been reactive to Western debates of Sino–African
relations, which results in defensive essays refuting Western criticisms of the PRC’s
role in Africa.34 Ironically, this only serves to further entrench the ‘myth-busting’
30. Stephen M. Walt, ‘The relationship between theory and policy in international relations’, Annual Review of
Political Science 8, (2005), pp. 23–48; Joseph S. Nye Jr, ‘Bridging the gap between theory and policy’, Political
Psychology 29(4), (2008), pp. 593–603; Alexander L. George, Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign
Policy (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993).
31. For example see Walt, ‘The relationship between theory and policy in international relations’, pp. 23–24.
32. Amitav Acharya, ‘Engagement or entrapment? Scholarship and policymaking on Asian regionalism’,
International Studies Review 13(1), (2011), p. 12.
33. We are grateful to the anonymous referee for this point. One good example of critical work on China–Africa
relations led by African scholars includes Ampiah and Naidu, eds, Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon?
34. He Wenping, ‘Zhongfei guanxi fazhan chudongle shei de shenjing?’ [‘Who’s nerves have the development of
Sino–African relations touched?’], Shijie zhishi [World Knowledge ] 19, (2006), pp. 30–32; Li Anshan, ‘Wei
zhongguo zhengming: zhongguo de feizhou zhanlu¨e yu guojia xingxiang’ [‘Establishing a name for China: China’s
Africa strategy and national image’], Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi [World Economy and Politics ] 4, (April 2008),




























narrative, irrespective of their intention to inform or not to inform Western
policymakers.
Western exceptionalism and international relations
The close link between the national security agenda and the academic literature in the
West can be also seen as a by-product of Western exceptionalism that remains
prevalent in the discipline of IR. As a field of study which emerged in the West as a
self-conscious academic discipline, Acharya and Barry Buzan argue, it is almost a
truism to say that ‘the main ideas in this discipline are deeply rooted in the
particularities and peculiarities of European history, the rise of the West to world
power, and the imposition of its own political structure onto the rest of the world’.35
This cultural/geographical bias has often resulted in a somewhat one-sided
interpretation of global order, in that Western dominance is seen as progressive and
thus the only form of hegemony that matters historically and normatively. The rise of
a non-Western state or non-Western hegemony is both poorly theorized and almost
axiomatically seen as a threat. The in-built Eurocentric biases of IR theory have
resulted in the European regional order being conceptualized as a product of
something rational and liberal, as it ensured the survival of individual sovereign states
and prevented the emergence of a (universal) empire.36
Thus, the global expansion of this order in the nineteenth century is celebrated as
an event where ‘Europe expands outwards and graciously bequeaths sovereignty and
Europe’s panoply of civilised and rational institutions to the inferior Eastern
societies’.37 Consequently, IR scholars working in the constructivist and English
School approaches have a tendency to interpret international normative change as a
two-step process, where ‘international norms’ are essentially seen as emanating from
the West and are transmitted via socialization to the ‘non-West’. This narrative
‘allows for the continued imagination and invention of Europe’s intellectual and
political superiority, treating the West as a perennial source of political and religious
tolerance’.38 This line of thinking can also be discerned in Buzan and Richard Little’s
work on international history when they note that there is a ‘story of unevenness . . .
on the difference between the West and the rest’, where ‘the Western states began to
Footnote 34 continued
pp. 6–15; Li Ruogu, ‘Xifang gui zhongfei hezuo de waiqu ji qi zhengwei’ [‘The West’s distortions and falsifications
of Sino–African cooperation’], Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi [World Economy and Politics ] 4, (2009), pp. 16–25; Luo
Jianbo and Zhang Xiaomin, ‘Multilateral cooperation in Africa between China and Western countries: from
differences to consensus’, Review of International Studies 37(4), (2011), pp. 1793–1813.
35. Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, ‘Why is there no non-Western international relations theory? An
introduction’, International Relations of the Asia Pacific 7(3), (2007), p. 293.
36. Edward Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
37. Benjamin de Carvalho, Halvard Leira and John M. Hobson, ‘The big bangs of IR: the myths that your teachers
still tell you about 1648 and 1919’, Millennium 39(3), (2011), p. 22; see also Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, eds,
The Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).
38. Turan Kayaoglu, ‘Westphalian Eurocentrism in international relations theory’, International Studies Review
12(2), (2010), pp. 195–196.




























develop a much more intense set of shared rules, norms and institutions amongst
themselves’.39 The Western world is depicted as a ‘more highly developed core’, and
again serves to demarcate the West from ‘the rest’.40
In the context of international politics today, this intellectual tradition frequently
manifests itself in a sense of Western exceptionalism.41 Proponents of American
exceptionalism paint ‘the world as a hostile place, an environment in which America
must constantly strive to control and eliminate evildoers before their malevolent acts
hit the American homeland’.42 This ‘permanent aura of exaggerated insecurity may
also help create and sustain the role and efforts’ of the US ‘to liberate others’ and
guide them to the trappings of liberal democracy and capitalist development.43 Given
this ideological belief, it is perhaps not surprising that the US is seen by some IR
scholars as an almost uniquely benevolent state in the contemporary international
system, as ‘no other country can make comparable contributions to international
order and stability’.44 The US is seen as ‘the only major power whose national
identity is defined by a set of universal political and economic values’,45 and is
frequently praised for its almost selfless distribution of public goods, such as its
provision of aid for the restructuring of Germany or Japan after WWII, or the opening
up of its markets that would allow other states’ economies to flourish.46 Even more
altruistically, the US is said to have chosen to surrender part of its power to a series of
international institutions, making its actions predictable and allaying other states’
fears. Thus it is claimed that
. . . the creation of rule-based agreements and political–security partnerships were both
good for the United States and for a huge part of the rest of the world. The result by the
end of the 1990s was a global political formation of unprecedented size and success—a
transoceanic coalition of democratic states tied together through markets, institutions,
and security partnerships.47
The case of Europe is somewhat different, as European states individually do not
have the same degree of political, economic and military clout that the US enjoys.
Nevertheless, Europe does count itself as part of the West, which still remains the
dominant force in the international order. Furthermore, the same sense of moral
superiority can also be found in European visions of itself as a ‘civilian power’ that is
39. Barry Buzan and Richard Little, International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International
Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 338.
40. Ibid.
41. This is not to suggest that exceptionalism is something unique to the West: for an interesting discussion of
Chinese exceptionalism vis-a`-vis Africa, see Chris Alden and Daniel Large, ‘China’s exceptionalism and the
challenges of delivering difference in Africa’, Journal of Contemporary China 20(68), (2011), pp. 21–38.
42. K. J. Holsti, ‘Exceptionalism in American foreign policy: is it exceptional?’, European Journal of
International Relations 17(3), (2011), p. 392.
43. Ibid., p. 394.
44. Samuel P. Huntington, ‘The clash of civilizations?’, Foreign Affairs 72(3), (1993), p. 82.
45. Ibid.
46. G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major
Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis,
and Transformation of the American World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011).
47. G. John Ikenberry, ‘Power and liberal order: America’s postwar world order in transition’, International
Relations of the Asia Pacific 5(2), (2005), p. 139.




























characterized by its ability to lead through ethical example.48 The European Union’s
(EU) existence as a post-Westphalian political entity has spawned an implicit belief
that it is an inherently progressive, cosmopolitan entity that has overcome and
transcended conflict arising from nationalism. In this sense, it is a pioneer that
‘changes the norms, standards and prescriptions of world politics away from the
bounded expectations of state-centricity’.49 Furthermore, in an age where the US is
either seen to be in decline or has squandered its moral authority through its unilateral
policies during the Bush presidency, the EU is seen to be uniquely positioned to
‘share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world’,50
primarily through the promotion of ‘sustainable peace, freedom, democracy, human
rights, rule of law, equality, social solidarity, sustainable development and good
governance’.51 Such policies are a strong reflection of the EU’s own self-identity as
an ‘ethical’ actor whose historical trajectory of development is universal and highly
worthy of emulation across the world.
Of course, not all theories of IR would necessarily see Western states as somehow
uniquely ‘ethical’ than the rest: as noted above, structural realism assumes that all
states are equally amoral, regardless of their cultural or ethnic makeup.52 Yet, even in
these theories, a curious sense of Eurocentrism lingers, albeit implicitly. As Isabelle
Grunberg has noted with reference to realist theories of hegemonic stability, while
most theorists concede that ‘great powers . . . pursue hegemony and open trade
policies for self-seeking motives’, it is assumed that in the cases of Western
hegemony ‘the effects of their policies are beneficial to other states as well . . . . This
is because they help create a structure that profits everybody by promoting growth’.53
The end of American hegemony thus becomes something not only bad for the US—it
is to the detriment of the entire world.
The big unknown of IR: the rise of a non-Western power
IR’s Eurocentrism, which originally derives from its almost exclusive focus on
historical periods of Western dominance, produces other problems. Crucial for our
argument here is the fact that the significantly long period of international history
where Europeans interacted with non-European polities and people from a position of
military inferiority is all but ignored.54 Consequently, the rise of a non-Western
power somehow becomes an ‘unknown’, an unprecedented and potentially dangerous
development. When Asian states are perceived to be on the ascendant, Western
leaders have claimed that the state in question ‘is an adversary who does not respect
48. Hartmut Mayer, ‘Is it still called Chinese whispers? The EU’s rhetoric and action as a responsible global
institution’, International Affairs 84(1), (2008), p. 62.
49. Ian Manners, ‘The normative ethics of the European Union’, International Affairs 84(1), (2008), p. 45.
50. European Council, A Secure Europe in a Better World, (12 December 2003), available at: http://www.
consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf (accessed 23 February 2013).
51. Manners, ‘The normative ethics of the European Union’, p. 66.
52. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002); Kenneth Waltz,
Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979).
53. IsabelleGrunberg, ‘Exploring the “myth”of hegemonic stability’, InternationalOrganization44(4), (1990),p. 440.
54. But see John M. Hobson, The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2004).




























the rules of the game and whose overwhelming desire is to conquer the world’.55
Worse still, its peoples have been depicted as ‘yellow dwarfs’ who ‘sit up all night
thinking of ways to screw us’.56
Crucially, these words were not uttered in the late-nineteenth century, but in 1991
by then French prime minister E´dith Cresson. Furthermore, they were not referring to
China, but Japan, which is not an authoritarian state, but a liberal democracy. These
statements have interesting similarities with the ‘Yellow Peril’ discourse, which can
be defined as a discourse that
. . . orders the peoples and phenomena of the Far Eastern ‘Orient’ into a praxiologically
constituted modal moral ‘logic’ . . . . In the matter of the ‘Yellow Peril’, the Asian
aggregate, or some subsegment of it . . . are feared because the dominant group . . .
believes that it, i.e. the particular element of the Asian aggregate under discussion, ‘is not
keeping to its [appropriately subordinated] place but threatens to claim opportunities and
privileges from which it has been excluded’; even more fearsome is the belief ‘felt [that
the Asian aggregate or its subset is] . . . a threat to the status, security, and welfare of the
dominant ethnic group’.57
In the context of contemporary international politics, this translates into an
assumption that relations between ‘Asia’ and the West are of a highly competitive,
zero-sum nature. As can be discerned from Cresson’s remarks above, the rise of an
Asian power is a grave challenge to the security of theWest. Regardless of the type of
regime, the Asian state in question is (somewhat mysteriously) assumed to be
opposed to Western values and interests, and will inevitably seek to overturn the
international status quo of Western dominance. This will also rob the West of its
privileged (but apparently deserved) position as the ‘norm maker’ in the international
community. Cresson was not alone in trumpeting the Japan threat theory in the early
1990s. Such views were gaining some traction in the US, with books such as The
Coming War with Japan declaring that the Japanese would overthrow American
hegemony in the Asia–Pacific.58 A report drafted for the CIA also ‘described the
Japanese as “creatures of an ageless, amoral, manipulative and controlling
culture”’,59 and darkly warned of ‘the potential of a Japanese–Soviet alliance that
would give Japan a hedge against an “American backlash”’.60
While these views may seem sensationalist and idiosyncratic in the context of
Japan’s subsequent economic stagnation and China’s rise today, it is important to
remind ourselves that the potential threat of Japan was taken seriously in academic
circles as well. Political scientists such as Christopher Layne claimed that Japan was
beginning ‘to develop the capability to gather and analyze politico-military and
55. ‘Outspoken Edith Cresson appointed as prime minister’, The Economist, (18 May 1991), retrieved from
Factiva database.
56. Robert Cottrell, ‘Profile: France’s Nicholas Ridley, Edith Cresson’, Independent on Sunday, (21 July 1991),
p. 26.
57. Stanford M. Lyman, ‘The “Yellow Peril” mystique: origins and vicissitudes of a racist discourse’,
International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society 13(4), (2000), p. 687.
58. George Friedman and Meredith LeBard, The Coming War with Japan (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991).
59. Laurie Goodstein, ‘Cap and gown, cloak and dagger at RIT; university’s CIA links generate stormy debate’,
Washington Post, (20 June 1991), p. A3.
60. ‘Japan lacks global responsibility—CIA-funded study’, Jiji Press, (10 June 1991), retrieved fromFactiva database.




























economic intelligence independently of the United States’,61 and concluded that this
was preliminary evidence of Japan’s desire to ‘acquire the full spectrum of great
power capabilities and its desire to seek international recognition of its great power
status’.62 Similarly, Samuel P. Huntington also warned:
In the 1930s Chamberlain and Daladier did not take seriously what Hitler said in Mein
Kampf. Truman and his successors did take it seriously when Stalin and Khrushchev said,
We will bury you. Americans would do well to take equally seriously both Japanese
declarations of their goal of achieving economic dominance and the strategy they are
pursuing to achieve that goal.63
The assumptions behind the ‘Yellow Peril’ discourse against Japan in the 1990s
are shared by more alarmist analyses of Sino–African relations today. The first of
these assumptions is that China and Japan are/were both perceived by the West as a
threat to the Western traditional dominance. Recent debates surrounding Sino–
African relations may be more than just a simple concern over China’s threat to the
welfare of Africa and African peoples. Rather, they implicitly reflect deeply-rooted
Western anxieties that their traditional dominance in Africa is about to be
overthrown by a non-Western power (a trend perhaps accelerated by the recent
global financial crisis), and that this is part of a broader trend of American and
European decline.
This is why academic and political debates surrounding Sino–African relations are
obsessed by the question of whether or not China’s growing role on the continent is
another manifestation of the ‘China threat’. The underlying assumption of zero-sum
competition between Asia and the West, which is a hallmark of the ‘Yellow Peril’
thesis, means that the PRC is axiomatically seen as a threat to the West’s privileged
position in Africa. In this context, many critics of China’s Africa policy frequently
fail to contextualize their arguments by considering the possibility that the EU could
also be seen as a threat to the region. Europe’s dominance in Africa has often been
criticized for neocolonialism by African analysts,64 and it is also worth noting that its
economic presence still overshadows that of China’s.65
It is, of course, possible to argue for the existence of a ‘China exception’ rule, in
the sense that it is not Asian powers that get treated as a threat: rather, it is China
that tends to be—perhaps unfairly—at the receiving end of the bulk of Western
criticisms and fears, while other Asian states are hardly criticized. There is certainly
a grain of truth to this point. For instance, Japan has hardly been criticized for its
trade ties with Sudan, even though it was one of Sudan’s key export partners along
61. Christopher Layne, ‘The unipolar illusion: why new great powers will rise’, International Security 17(4),
(1993), p. 38.
62. Ibid., p. 37.
63. Samuel P. Huntington, ‘Why international primacy matters’, International Security 17(4), (1993), p. 76.
64. Chukwuma Charles Soludo, ‘From Berlin to Brussels: will Europe underdevelop Africa again?’, New African
516, (2012), pp. 10–17; see also Adebajo, ‘An axis of evil?’.
65. In 2009, the EU’s share of trade in Africa was 63.5%, as opposed to China’s 13.9%. In the case of FDI flows to
African countries, the EU’s share between the years 2005 and 2010 was 43.7%, as opposed to China’s 0.9%. See
African Development Bank, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, United Nations
Development Programme and The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, African Economic Outlook
2011: Africa and its Emerging Partners (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2011), pp. 97, 101.




























with China.66 Yet, such ‘China-bashing’ has interesting parallels with ‘Japan
bashing’ that was prevalent in the early 1990s, and this suggests a thread of
continuity in these discourses that cannot simply be reduced to factors unique to
China. It is telling that some of the literature—consciously or not—uses the term
‘China Inc.’, which originates from ‘Japan Inc.’ and was used in the ‘Japan threat’
theses. It was seen as ‘synonymous with a broader Japanese undertaking to pursue
economic success regardless of the social and environmental costs at home or the
detriment to relations with other nations, particularly the United States’,67 just like
the PRC is accused of doing today in Africa.
The second of the assumptions shared by the Western study of Sino–Africa
relations and the ‘Yellow Peril’ discourse is a curious sense of cultural bias which
casts Asian states—be they democratic or authoritarian, as seen from the examples of
the China and Japan threat theses—as entities that are somehow fundamentally
different from the West, and therefore a threat. The result is an almost knee-jerk
reaction that sees any influences in Africa other than Western ones as immoral and
undesirable.
One famous example of this line of thinking comes from Samuel P. Huntington’s
Clash of Civilizations thesis, which posited that future conflicts would take place
between different civilizations, rather than states. Here, states were deemed potential
threats not only because of their potential to be strategic peer rivals to the US, but
primarily because they were culturally fundamentally different. It is interesting to
note that Germany—which like Japan was at times touted as a potential challenger to
US hegemony in the early 1990s by some structural realists68—somehow gets taken
off the list of potential enemies of the US, by the simple virtue of it apparently
belonging to the zone of Western Christianity. Japan and China remain in different
civilizational entities. Huntington assumes that different civilizations will almost
inevitably clash, and the fact that Japan and China are different means that they will
necessarily be a threat toWestern civilization.69 Although Huntington’s controversial
argument has been subjected to a wide range of criticisms,70 other analysts seem to
share Huntington’s assumption that cultural difference somehow produces a threat to
global stability. Emma Mawdsley’s research into British broadsheet newspapers’
representations of China and Africa shows that many pundits seem to reproduce
implicitly the dichotomy between an inherently ‘unethical’ non-West and an ‘ethical’
West whose dominance is ultimately good for the rest of the world. Thus:
66. The 2005 CIA World Fact Book, for instance, places Japan second behind China as Sudan’s export partner,
with 10.7% of the share of Sudanese exports. China had 66.9%, and Saudi Arabia, at 4.4%, came third. These can be
accessed from http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps35389/ (accessed 9 February 2013).
67. Narrelle Morris, Japan Bashing: Anti-Japanism since the 1980s (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), pp. 23–24. In
the China–Africa case, see for example: Gill and Reilly, ‘The tenuous hold of China Inc. in Africa’. We are grateful
to the anonymous reviewer’s comments in helping us to develop this point further.
68. John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Back to the future: instability in Europe after the Cold War’, International Security 15
(1), (1990), pp. 5–56; Layne, ‘The unipolar illusion’, pp. 5–51.
69. Huntington, ‘The clash of civilizations?’, pp. 22–49.
70. For example Robert W. Cox, The Political Economy of a Plural World: Critical Reflections on Power, Morals
and Civilization (London: Routledge, 2002); Gerard Delanty, ‘The making of a post-Western Europe: a civilizational
analysis’, Thesis Eleven 72(1), (2003), pp. 8–25; John Mandalios, ‘Civilizational complexes and processes: Elias,
Nelson and Eisenstadt’, in Gerard Delanty and Engin F. Isin, eds, Handbook of Historical Sociology (London: Sage,
2003).




























Western actors—businesses, governments, national and international development
NGOs—are typically portrayed as benign . . . the mistakes of the past have been
addressed, and the West is now the architect and energizer of a new drive towards good
governance and development, with aid now accompanied by ethical conditionalities,
while reformed commercial practices promise investment and trade that will enhance
development rather than line the pockets of kleptocratic elites.71
The growing stature of the PRC in the African continent therefore not only becomes a
strategic threat to the West: it also challenges deeply-rooted notions of the Western
‘self’. As Mawdsley notes, ‘Western political imaginaries of itself in relation to
Africa remain dominated by an enduring notion of trusteeship, despite a long and
ongoing history of exploitation, and lack of sufficient action to address systemic
inequalities and injustice’.72 US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton seemed to echo this
theme when she stated that China must join the US efforts to support democracy and
increase transparency in economic activities, otherwise we will see a ‘new
colonialism’ on the continent:
We are . . . concerned that China’s foreign assistance and investment practices in Africa
have not always been consistent with generally accepted international norms of
transparency and good governance, and that it has not always utilised the talents of the
African people in pursuing its business interests.73
The ‘Yellow Peril’ discourse is also related to the issue of a perceived lack of
China’s ‘responsibility’ in its Africa policy. The PRC is criticized for its ‘security
free riding’ and unwillingness ‘to work with the international and African regional
community’,74 which leads to the limited degree of Sino–Western cooperation in
providing stability and security to Africa.75 While it is true that the Chinese side does
display reluctance to coordinate their Africa policies with a third party such as the US
and EU, Western analysts frequently fail to question whether or not the uncritical
acceptance of Western moral superiority, assumed benevolence towards Africa, or
intellectual influences of the ‘Yellow Peril’ discourse result in a problematicWestern
refusal to coordinate its policies with the Chinese. This argument again shares a
similarity with so-called ‘Japan bashing’, where a decidedly ‘selfish’ Japanese
identity was constructed in order to warn against the threat a rising Japan would pose
to Western dominance. Japan was, in similar fashion to China in Africa, accused of
free-riding on American security provision, and ‘reneging on its moral obligations to
the United States, which it allegedly owed as a result of the United States’ post-war
71. Emma Mawdsley, ‘Fu Manchu versus Dr Livingstone in the dark continent? Representing China, Africa and
the West in British broadsheet newspapers’, Political Geography 27(5), (2008), pp. 519–520.
72. Ibid., p. 512; see also William Pfaff, ‘A new colonialism? Europe must go back into Africa’, Foreign Affairs
74(1), (1995), pp. 2–6.
73. Cited in Andrew Quinn, ‘Clinton warns Africa of China’s economic embrace’, Reuters, (10 June 2011),
available at: http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/06/10/us-clinton-africa-idUSTRE75962920110610 (accessed 23
February 2013).
74. Holslag and Van Hoeymissen, eds, The Limits of Socialization, p. 11.
75. Exceptions include UK–China–Africa trilateral cooperation. See UK Department for International
Development website, available at: http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Where-we-work/Asia-East-Pacific/China/, and UK
National Archives, Minutes for the Africa–Britain–China Conference on Agriculture and Fisheries, available at:
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/þ /http://www.dfid.gov.uk/documents/china-africa/mins-afr-brit-ch-conf-
agr-fish.pdf (accessed 18 February 2013).




























contributions to and support of Japan’.76 It was also blamed for using its growing
power irresponsibly, as epitomized by then Newsweek editor Robert J. Samuelson,
who ‘argued . . . that Japan had acquired global responsibilities “before being
capable, psychologically and politically, of discharging them”’.77
What is to be done? Burning questions of Sino–African relations
This article has analyzed why so much ink has been spilt to assess whether or not
China is a unique threat to Africa, even though the conclusions have often indicated
that the Chinese have acted neither better nor worse than many Western actors. We
have argued that the study of Sino–African relations is closely linked with the
Western governments’ geostrategic interests, and that both sides of the debate remain
deeply influenced by the Eurocentrism and the ‘Yellow Peril’ discourse that continue
to linger in IR. These studies bring with them a myopic agenda that revolves almost
exclusively around the question of China’s ‘challenge’ to the West.
What, then, needs to be done to find new questions in Sino–African relations that
go beyond national security and Western-centric agendas? We suggest a number of
possible paths. First, the research agenda needs to be defined with attention paid to
historical continuity, rather than simply following policy/academic ‘fashions’. As
mentioned at the beginning of this article, China’s Africa policy has transformed
every decade or two: from its support for proletarian revolutions in the 1960s,
counter-hegemony to the US and to the Soviet Union in the 1970s, promotion of
African self-reliance (a rhetorical term for indicating China’s waning of interest in
Africa) in the 1980s and 1990s, and to its return to Africa.78 China’s increasing
interest in Africa may be ‘hot’ in scholarship today, but who can be sure that China
will not lose interest in Africa again in the next decade?
Second, Chinese perspectives need to be explored further. Despite its official
stance, China’s primary foreign policy goals and interests are still based on its
relations with the developed powers, particularly the US and Japan, not in the
developing world.79 It therefore does not have many Africanists compared to
specialists on the developed powers. Yet, there is a growing number of institutions
specializing in the study of Africa (such as Zhejiang Normal University, Xiangtan
University, Beijing University, Chinese Foreign Affairs University, Yunnan
University and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences). Furthermore, the nature
of Chinese studies of Sino–African relations is undergoing a change. As mentioned
earlier, previous research was frequently reactive to Western debates of Sino–
African relations, and often resulted in defensive essays refuting Western criticisms
76. Morris, Japan Bashing, p. 25.
77. Ibid.
78. Joshua Eisenman, ‘China’s post-ColdWar strategy in Africa: examining Beijing’s methods and objectives’, in
Joshua Eisenman, Eric Heginbotham and Derek Mitchell, eds, China and the Developing World: Beijing’s Strategy
for the Twenty-First Century (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2007).
79. Peter Van Ness, ‘China as a third world state: foreign policy and official national identity’, in Lowell Dittmer
and Samuel S. Kim, eds, China’s Quest for National Identity (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); Shogo
Suzuki, ‘Journey to the west: China debates its “great power” identity’, paper presented at Sino–Australian Security
Relations: Regional Cooperation in an Interdependent World conference, Australian National University, Canberra
(October 2007).




























of the PRC’s role in Africa. However, there is emerging Chinese literature that goes
beyond defending and promoting Beijing’s Africa policies. Some have been critical
of Chinese reliance on (outdated) Western stereotypes to understand Africa,80 while
others have critiqued Chinese officials for their lack of initiative in realizing
cooperation agreements.81 There is also increasing appreciation of exploitation of
Africans by rapacious Chinese entrepreneurs, and that this is harmful to Chinese
foreign policy goals.82 Greater engagement is needed with these critical voices that
exist in China. Furthermore, a number of Chinese scholars are now conducting field
research in Africa for a lengthy period, and they bring an empirically rich and critical
research to the study of Sino–African relations that go beyond the confined nature of
the debate that serves the strategic interests of governments.83
Relevant to the second point, the third path is to encourage Chinese and African
scholars to set the research agendas of China–Africa relations. The majority of the
literature on Sino–African relations in English is written by US and European
scholars who work on Africa, security and development, and international relations,
with a heavy reliance on English-language materials. This, as Daniel Large correctly
concludes, has ‘the danger of playing out a self-referential logic’,84 as well as
reproducing the national security agendas of Western states. The study of Sino–
African relations therefore needs to be diversified further and reflect more African
perspectives, rather than Western strategic anxieties. Sino–African relations are
indeed the result of generalization of the relationship between China and individual
African states. Yet, among 54 countries in Africa, there are only about a dozen
countries that often attract attention in the study of Sino–African relations, such as
Sudan, Angola and Zimbabwe. In recent years, however, there has been a welcome
80. Li Xiaoyun, ‘Zhongguo yao gaibian ziji de feizhou guan’ [‘China needs to change its own views of Africa’],
Fenghuang zhoukan, (15 June 2011).
81. Zhou Haijin, ‘Lun xin shiqi zhongke wenhua yu hezuo’ [‘Sino–Cameroon cultural exchange and cooperation
in the new era’], Zhejiang shifan daxue xuebao [Journal of Zhejiang Normal University ] (Social Sciences) 36(4),
(2011), pp. 16–20.
82. Zhao Minghao, ‘Zhongfei minjian jiaowang: jinzhan ji mianlin de tiaozhan’ [‘Sino–African civilian
interactions: developments and challenges faced’], Guoji zhanwang [International Perspective ] 6, (2010),
pp. 49–62.
83. Examples include Chen Fenglan, ‘Wenhua chongtu yu kuaguo qianyi qunti de shiying celu¨e: yi nanfei
zhongguo xinyimin qunti weili’ [‘Cultural differences and strategies for adaptation by transnational immigration
group: a case study of new Chinese immigrants in South Africa’], Huaqiao Huaren Lishi Yanjiu [Overseas Chinese
History Studies ] 3, (2011), pp. 41–49; and Guo Zhanfeng, Li Xiaoyun and Qi Gubo, ‘Zhongfei xiaonong jiating
nongye shengchan zuzhi guocheng duibi fenxi: jiyu feizhou sancun de tianye diaocha’ [‘Comparative analysis of the
processes of small-scale household agricultural production organizations in China and Africa: based on fieldwork in
three villages in Africa’], Guangxi Minzu Daxue Xuebao [Journal of Guangxi University for Nationalities ]
(Philosophy and Social Science Edition) 34(2), (2012), pp. 82–89. A number of Chinese scholars also advocate the
conducting of field research as one of the key methods for ‘Chinese African studies’. See, Ma Yankun, ‘Renleixue
feizhou yanjiu ji zhongguo xueke jiangou de xianshi suqiu’ [‘Anthropolitical African studies and the realistic seeking
for its course building in China’], Xiya Feizhou [West Asia and Africa ] 7, (2010), pp. 26–31; Liu Hongwu, ‘Zai guoji
xueshu pingtai yu sixiang gaodishang jiangou guojia huayuquan: Zailun jiangou you tese zhi “zhongguo feizhouxue”
de teshu shidai yiyi’ [‘To construct Chinese national discourse rights on international academic platform and
ideological high ground: a further study on the special significance of the era of constructing a unique “Chinese
African studies”’], Xiya Feizhou [West Asia and Africa ] 5, (2010), pp. 17–23; and Liu Hongwu, ‘Guoji sixiang
jingzheng yu feizhou yanjiu de zhongguo xuepai’ [‘International competition of thoughts and the Chinese school of
African studies’], Guoji Zhengzhi Yanjiu [International Politics Quarterly ] 4, (2011), pp. 89–97.
84. Daniel Large, ‘Beyond “dragon in the bush”: the study of China–Africa relations’, African Affairs 107(426),
(2008), p. 58.




























trend of global research collaboration among scholars from China, Africa, the West
and other parts of the world. For example, ‘The Chinese in Africa/Africans in China
Research Network’—a global independent network which has been hosted by the
University of Johannesburg and Rhodes University—aims to facilitate discussions
and collaboration on social, economic and political research on issues relating to
people-to-people encounters.85 More of these kinds of efforts will be necessary to
diversify and deepen the study of Sino–African relations.
Research by African scholars may find both Western and Chinese policies on the
continent contrary to African interests,86 or could even demonstrate that support for
Chinese policies in Africa is not limited to ‘isolated autocrats’ alone.87 Whichever
way, these works have the potential to serve as a powerful critique to the dichotomous
and myopic debates of the ‘China threat’ that has impoverished the debate on Sino–
African relations. It will also help overcome complacent Western views that Western
ideological influences are axiomatically ‘universal’ and will be welcomed by the
peoples throughout the world.
Fourth, it is important to take an anthropological perspective to what is often
regarded by the West as universal concepts, such as democracy, human rights,
security, poverty and development. While these are the major themes of the study of
Sino–African relations, the meaning of these terms varies depending on the region.
When using terms that originated in the West in a different context, researchers
could fall into the trap of using a square peg in a round hole. The study of Sino–
African relations is even more complicated, given that it requires examination of
such terms in at least three different contexts—one in Africa, one in the West and
one in China. It is essential to scrutinize how each actor conceptualizes these basic
terms.
But more fundamentally, we need to overcome the deep sense of Western
exceptionalism that has continued to color the lenses by which we view
international politics. As has been noted with reference to Orientalism in strategic
studies, it
. . . is not enough to show that myths about the enemy are empirically flawed. The
exotic eastern warrior will not stop being a silhouette in the Western imagination.
We therefore need to ask why, to understand what motivates our fascination in the
first place, and recognise that these myths are powerful codes through which
Westerners debate about themselves . . . . One-dimensional caricatures of Oriental
warfare reflect the anxieties, fears, ambitions, confidence or self-doubt of Western
observers . . . 88
In many respects, the same critique could be applied to the study of Sino–African
relations today. Much of the literature that voices fears that China is systematically
undermining Western influence and power on the African continent (as well as the
85. Yoon Jung Park, e-mail messages to the authors, 26 February and 10 August 2013.
86. See for example Adebajo, ‘An axis of evil?’; Lloyd Sachikonye, ‘Crouching tiger, hidden agenda?
Zimbabwe–China relations’, in Ampiah and Naidu, eds, Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon.
87. See Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong, ‘African perspectives on China–Africa links’, The China Quarterly
199, (2009), pp. 728–759.
88. Patrick Porter, Military Orientalism: Eastern War through Western Eyes (London: Hurst & Co, 2009).




























stream of literature that refutes it) is more a debate about the West’s own deep-
seated anxieties, rather than what the PRC is actually doing or not doing in Africa.
Such thinking, however, not only serves to impoverish our scholarship and
understanding of China and Africa’s interactions, but also has the danger of
unnecessarily creating a new ‘China threat’ edifice which is nothing but a by-product
of Western fears that its influence and thinking are no longer regarded as ‘universal’
and ‘authoritative’.
‘MYTH-BUSTING’ IN SINO–AFRICAN RELATIONS
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